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Abstract
Large technology firms pose new challenges for local economic development in the 21st century. They are attractive tar-
gets for local economic developers because they have the potential of providing permanent, well-paying jobs. This arti-
cle examines two mega-economic development deals. Amazon’s proposed second headquarters in Queens and Sidewalk
Labs’ Quayside proposal for the Toronto waterfront pit large and prosperous Big Tech firms against local governments with
healthy economies. Amazon abandoned the New York City site it had chosen, rather than open new negotiations with local
officials and citizens. Sidewalk Labs withdrew from the Quayside proposal after two and a half years of negotiation focus-
ing mostly on the size of the proposed development. Although the potential benefits may be substantial, incentivizing Big
Tech’s location decisions may be well beyond the means of most cities, especially those with distressed economies.
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1. Introduction
Over the past few decades, local economic develop-
ment efforts, particularly in North America, have been af-
fected by deindustrialization and the growth of informa-
tion technology. The ‘new economy’ of the 21st century
places greater emphasis on services and investments
in human capital (Alcaly, 2003; Glaeser & Saiz, 2004).
Manufacturing employment in North America has de-
clined as a result of both automation and the transfer
of routine production activity to lower wage locations
(Bluestone, 2003). The Computer Revolution has not only
led to expansion of new highly skilled jobs, but it has also
exacerbated the uneven growth of urban areas (Berger &
Frey, 2015).
The primary objective of this article is to assess
how this ongoing economic restructuring has affected
economic development practices in North America. We
do this through an examination of two significant de-
velopment proposals in which giant technology compa-
nies sought incentives and concessions from prosperous
global cities. While development proposals at this scale
are likely to be uncommon, we believe that these exam-
ples are indicative of how Big Techmay redefine the local
economic development process.
For the past 75 years, governments have used in-
centives to redirect private investment to promote local
economic development. Often, these efforts are justified
as corrections for perceived ‘market failures’ (Seidman,
2005). Areas may be targeted because they are low in-
come, with high unemployment and declining popula-
tions and property values. Incentives are perceived to
be necessary to make these locations more competi-
tive; private investments would not occur ‘but for’ the
availability of incentives (Peters & Fisher, 2004; Sands &
Reese, 2012).
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Critics of economic development incentives argue
that they are a form of ‘corporate welfare,’ in effect pay-
ing firms to do what they would likely have done absent
the incentives (LeRoy, 2005). Peters and Fisher (2004)
suggest that 90% of economic development spending is
wasted. When large scale investments are at stake, how-
ever, as in the location of a large manufacturing plant
or corporate headquarters, the firms frequently have the
upper hand in negotiations (LeRoy, 2018). Although they
are often characterized as win-win situations, the pub-
lic sector is typically responsible for substantial upfront
costs, while the corporate investors receive benefits long
before the government or its citizens do.
Traditional economic development strategies have
sought to attract manufacturing jobs and the attendant
investment in plant and equipment. In recent decades,
globalization and deindustrialization have contributed to
the decline of manufacturing, making competition for
new manufacturing facilities more intense. The growth
of information technology and the ‘knowledge economy’
has introduced a new focus for economic development
activity (Berger & Frey, 2015). Tech firms are desirable
targets for economic developers because they pay high
wages, are less restricted in their location choices by
need for accessibility to raw materials, supply chains
and customers, benefit from clustering of firms and con-
tribute to a positive image for the host community.
The emergence of high-tech firms as a target of eco-
nomic development efforts could fundamentally change
the nature of local economic development. In this arti-
cle, we consider several issues related to these poten-
tial changes: Does the focus on high tech firms represent
a new local economic development paradigm, one that
introduces new policy instruments, to attract high end
jobs? Will this new focus also shift the balance of power
between the public and private sectors, as well as among
the communities seeking to attract new economy firms,
those that are high tech and information intensive? How
does this ‘reaching for the top’ in terms of firms and job
categories and the economic status of residents differ
from the previous economic development attempts to
attract middle-class manufacturing jobs?
We offer two examples of urban economic develop-
ment approaches that involve firms at the summit of the
corporate hierarchy and that target, for the most part,
high-income residents. One is the settlement of the head-
quarters of one of the largest US corporations and the
other the planning and development by another giant
firm of a central neighborhood according to a technolog-
ically driven model. While not claiming to cover all possi-
ble variants, these examples nonetheless illustrate how
manifestations of this type of ‘summit’ development can
differ from one another.
These examples share defining features of this top-
reaching form of urban economic development. First,
they target highly valuable, centrally located land in
global cities at the summit of their national urban system.
Second, the main proponents are Tech Giants. The devel-
opments target top corporations and, to a large extent,
high-income residents. Although the attention in the ar-
ticle is on large projects deployed in global cities, analo-
gous features of these projects are found in smaller-scale
economic development initiatives occurring in variously
sized urban areas. The focus is thus on iconic examples of
an economic development transition that is widespread.
The next section of the article provides a brief
overview of trends in local economic development poli-
cies. This is followed by a description of the cases, includ-
ing a comparison of their key features. The article con-
cludes with a discussion of the implications of these new
economic development models for public policy.
2. Economic Development Policy Trends
Local economic development strategies have evolved
through several phases during the last half of the
20th century (Eisinger, 1988; Jansa & Gray, 2017;
Tassonyi, 2005). From the mid-1980s, the emphasis was
on the attraction or retention of businesses by provid-
ing subsidized infrastructure or targeted incentives such
as tax abatements (Hill, Wolman, Kowalczky, & St. Clair,
2012; Saiz & Clarke, 2013). The second period introduced
a new focus on financial, technological and knowledge
infrastructure (Tassonyi, 2005). In the early 2000s, it ap-
peared that the emphasis had begun to shift to strategies
based on human capital development and quality of life
enhancement including arts and culture-driven strate-
gies (Florida, 2002; Grodach, 2011; Stern& Seifert, 2010).
These periods have been cumulative rather than evolu-
tionary, however; once in place, early tools and strate-
gies continue to be used. It appears difficult to ‘wind
down’ the use of subsidies once they have been intro-
duced (Jansa & Gray, 2017).
The Great Recession (2008–2009) provided a flash-
point for revisiting local development policy to explore
potential impacts on how local governments approach
development and the extent of resources allocated to
that effort. The stresses of the Great Recession appear
to have reinforced the path dependency of local develop-
ment policy, pushing municipalities toward ever more in-
tensive use of the same old set of incentives. Businesses
come to expect particular incentives once they are of-
fered by a number of cities or states, and the tool be-
comes locked in place as a standard part of development
packages (Reese, 2006; Sands & Reese, 2012).
As manufacturing employment has decreased, lo-
cal officials have become ever more focused on attract-
ing higher order, often technology intensive employers.
Research on cities that have managed to come back
from economic distress has indicated that, while specific
strategies have varied, investment in a technology-based
economy and an ‘environmentally friendly lifestyle’
(read: a lifestyle for the upper and creative classes) has
been common (Kodrzycki & Muñoz, 2015). For a partic-
ular group of cities, those world class ones in the top-
tier, competition increases as they alone can afford the
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types of ‘deals’ that rent-seeking firms’ desire in their
location processes (Markusen & Nesse, 2007). Although
focused at the state level, some of the largest incentive
deals in the US from 2006 to 2013 have gone to informa-
tion technology firms and retailers that have substantial
sales in e-tail such as Amazon and were provided by just
“a few states subsidizing a few large firms” (Jansa & Gray,
2017, p. 56).
Examinations of local development policy trends
post-Great Recession have come to similar conclusions:
“A dramatic rise in the use of business incentives”
(Warner & Zheng, 2013, p. 90) post-recession has led
local officials to offer more and larger traditional in-
centives to attract new targets of employment, specifi-
cally the technology sector (Lowe, 2012). Analysis of the
2004 and 2009 International City/County Management
Association surveys indicated that increasing numbers of
local government respondents said that the technology
sector was the primary focus of their economic develop-
ment activities (Warner & Zheng, 2013). Direct govern-
ment financial support of research and development ap-
pears particularly important in attracting multinational
firms (Rodríguez-Pose & Wilkie, 2016) and the technol-
ogy sector is increasingly the focus of local economic de-
velopment (Warner & Zheng, 2013). Similar conclusions
have been drawn about economic development policy
at the state level where overall spending on subsidies
to influence industry location decisions has increased as
has the number of very large subsidy packages, although
again, states vary in the size of their incentives packages
if not their content (Jansa & Gray, 2017). In other words,
the old dogs are being asked to perform the same tricks
but for a different audience. But only a small group of
cities can afford to have the largest dogs.
This is exacerbated by the fact that, along with the
size of the incentive packages, themost sought-after busi-
nesses are increasingly those that provide high paying
jobs for skilledworkers. Research suggests that the largest
firms and those most active in lobbying governments for
incentives are likely to benefit the most from the increas-
ing size of incentive packages (Jansa & Gray, 2017) al-
though there is a chicken and egg quandary here: Are in-
centive packages larger because of the changing nature
of the firms that cities are trying to attract or do larger
firms have the resources to drive the incentive packages
upwards? From an equity standpoint, multinational firms
appear to favor citieswith greater connectivity in terms of
producer services, airport passenger traffic and interna-
tional co-inventor activity when locating their headquar-
ters (Belderbos, Du, & Goerzen, 2017), while high tech
jobs are likely to locate in cities with a more advanced
skills base (Berger & Frey, 2015). These are also the com-
munities most likely to be able to afford expensive incen-
tive packages, leading to a rich get richer dynamic.
There are a variety of reasons—both political and
economic—why public subsidization of private firms has
increased over time in both numbers of incentives and
the magnitudes of the deals: the recession, the path de-
pendent nature of economic development policy, com-
petition between cities and states, the loss of large man-
ufacturing entities forcing communities to compete for
a smaller pool of higher tech jobs, capture of the policy-
making process by business via both lobbying and cam-
paign donations, and the tendency for local officials to
view subsidizing business as being in the ‘public interest’
(Bartik, 2019; Jansa & Gray, 2017; Kwak, 2014; Posner,
2014; Sands & Reese, 2012). At the same time, and de-
spite considerable research attesting to their effective-
ness, there has been a shift away from economic de-
velopment incentives that invest in the local commu-
nity more broadly defined: education, job training, ser-
vices, and small business start-up support (Filion, Reese,
& Sands, 2019; Hill et al., 2012; Kodrzycki &Muñoz, 2015;
Reese & Ye, 2011). Ten years after the end of the Great
Recession andwell into the global rise of high technology
and Internet-dependent firms, has local economic devel-
opment fundamentally changed?
3. Case Study Methodology
This article considers two examples of large economic de-
velopment projects that made use of a variety of incen-
tives to promote investment. The two case studies are
based on a literature review and secondary analysis of
publicly available documents, including government re-
ports, corporate proposals, third party analyses and me-
dia reports. Details of the negotiations are not publicly
available. As a result, we can be certain of outcomes but
often not of the negotiations that led up to them.
In 2017, Amazon held an open competition to decide
a location for its second headquarters (HQ2). The com-
pany announced its selection of Long Island City as one
of two locations that would share the total investment
and jobs, but then abandoned this location despite be-
ing offered a $3 billion incentive package. Sidewalk Labs
(the city-building division of Alphabet, the parent com-
pany of Google) responded to a request for proposals
to create an innovation neighborhood in Toronto, but
after two and a half years of plan making and negoti-
ations, dropped the project invoking economic uncer-
tainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. These high-
profile cases were selected based on several criteria.
First, we believe they reflect a turn in economic develop-
ment tendencies, focusing on high-status jobs and res-
idents, firms at the top of the corporate hierarchy and
the most appealing cities and sectors therein. Second,
they represent cases that illustrate bargaining between
the public and private sectors. Finally, the local govern-
ment agencies in New York and Toronto are expected to
be in a relatively strong bargaining position vis a vis the
high-tech firms at hand.
3.1. Case Analysis: Amazon’s HQ2
Amazon exhibits many of the salient characteristics of
the modern technology driven firm. In a relatively short
Urban Planning, 2020, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 392–402 394
period, it has risen from an on-line book retailer to be-
come a diversified e-commerce conglomerate that is
one of the most valuable companies in the world. The
firm’s profitability has been enhanced by some $2.4 bil-
lion in subsidies that it has received from state and
local governments over the years (Weise, Fernandez,
& Eligon, 2019). In initiating what has been described
as a “Hunger Games-style civic competition” (Matsakis,
2018), Amazon’s search for a location for a HQ2 epito-
mizes the superior bargaining power of Big Tech, as well
as what can go wrong with economic development initia-
tives in the current post-manufacturing era.
The announcement by Amazon of an open competi-
tion to select the location for its HQ2 represents one of
the single largest economic development opportunities
in history. Amazon offered the winning city a $5 billion in-
vestment and the creation of up to 50,000 well-paid new
jobs (Matsakis, 2018). Implicit in the announcement was
the expectation that Amazon would be able to obtain
larger incentives through inter-municipal competition. In
addition, the proposal responses (more than 200 in total)
provided Amazon with valuable intelligence on the com-
munities that were not selected.
Amazon’s request for proposals identified the criteria
that would be important in their decision. The company
sought a site in an urban area with a minimum popula-
tion of one million that offered readily available sites, af-
fordable housing, good public transportation, and a large
pool of skilled workers. Amazon essentially asked com-
munities what such a massive investment and job cre-
ation opportunity was worth to them, what sort of trib-
ute they were willing to offer to secure the favor of the
world’s richest individual.
There are a number of reasons why local communi-
ties would consider Amazon to be worthy of receiving in-
centives. As initially proposed, the Amazon HQ2 would
provide a substantial number of jobs. The jobs would
be new to the selected community and to the local la-
bor market in general; that is, they would not be trans-
fers from a nearby existing location. The new jobs would
be highly desirable because they would be well paid,
an average salary of $150,000. These jobs are particu-
larly attractive because they are ‘new economy’ jobs—
digital, high-tech, information intensive—with good fu-
ture prospects. Nor will they produce the negative exter-
nalities (such as air and water pollution) that a similar
number of manufacturing jobs might. The Amazon HQ2
is perceived as being particularly footloose since it is not
dependent on supply chains and distribution networks.
In November 2018, Amazon announced that it would
split its HQ2 between New York City and Northern
Virginia (Berube, 2018). Each location would see half of
the total promised investment and half of the jobs. The
New York site selected was Long Island City in Queens.
The site is served by eight subway lines and the Long
Island Railroad. Existing office space totals 2.5 million
square feet, with 500,000 square feet available for phase
one in the Court Square Building. In addition, Long Island
City offered the potential for 7.6 million square feet
of new construction, most on land controlled by the
city and state (State of New York, 2017). Amazon’s fa-
cilities would be integrated into the existing urban fab-
ric, rather than being isolated on a separate campus;
its space needs could be accommodated within a five-
minute walk.
The Long Island City neighborhood, while some-
what neglected, could hardly be classified as distressed.
Indeed, the demographic profile of the ZIP code area that
includes the site closely matches that of New York City
as a whole (Table 1). Census Bureau data indicate that
the area’s recent job growth rate was double the City-
wide average.
The incentive package that the City and State of
New York offered to Amazon was valued at $3 bil-
lion (Campbell, 2018). In return for creating 25,000 to
40,000 high paying jobs and occupying at least four mil-
lion square feet of office space, Amazon’s income taxes
would be reducedby $2.1 billion and its property taxes by
$386 million. An additional amount (up to $505 million)
would be in the form of cash grants tied to job creation.
On February 14, 2019, Amazon announced that it
was canceling plans for its HQ2 investment in New York
City (McCartney & O’Connell, 2019). Amazon indicated
that it was unwilling to proceed with the project in the
face of grass roots and political opposition. Although
there was a real risk that the project could be denied
Table 1. Socio-economic characteristics of the Long Island City area 2017 according to the American Community Survey
(2017).
New York City Long Island City
ZIP code 11101
Population 2017 8,426,746 25,880
Average household size 2.7 2.3
Adults with BA 36.7% 47.0%
Median household income $60,819 $60,560
Poverty rate 20.6% 21.9%
Unemployment rate 4.2% 6.7%
Median home value $836,226 $951,480
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a necessary approval by the Public Authorities Control
Board (Ritholz, 2019), for the most part, the proposal en-
joyed the support of the City and State (de Blasio, 2019;
Goodman, 2019). A mutually acceptable agreement had
been reached between Amazon and New York City and
State, the details of which have not however been made
public. When confronted with community and some po-
litical opposition, the firm simply decided to walk away.
3.2. Case Study: Sidewalk Toronto’s Quayside
Toronto, Ontario is the fastest growing major urban re-
gion in North America. For Toronto, the issue is not how
to attract economic development but rather how the
seemingly inevitable growth can be managed most suc-
cessfully. Thus, the effort byWaterfront Toronto to find a
partner for the redevelopment of the EasternWaterfront
area should provide an example of an economic devel-
opment scenario in which the public sector retains the
upper hand.
The restructuring of Toronto’s economy in the later
decades of the 20th century has created opportunities
for the redevelopment of the city’s manufacturing and
port facilities to accommodate the rapid growth of finan-
cial, technology and professional services employment,
as well as recreation and tourism. Waterfront Toronto,
a public body created by the Municipal, Provincial and
Federal governments, was charged with overseeing the
transformation of Toronto’s lakeshore through infrastruc-
ture (including investments in flood control, wastew-
ater management and transportation projects), open
space development and participation in the creation of
new employment and residential centers. Since its cre-
ation in 1999, Waterfront Toronto has been responsible
for 2.5 million square feet of construction, 2,600 hous-
ing units and 90 acres of parks and public open space
(Waterfront Toronto, 2017).
The Quayside site is located south of Lake Shore
Boulevard East, about two kilometers east of Union
Station (at the center of Downtown Toronto). To the
south and east of the Quayside parcel, the area con-
sists primarily of vacant industrial and commercial prop-
erties, most of which are in public ownership. North of
the site, but separated from it by the elevated Gardiner
Expressway, is a residential area of mid-rise residential
units. The demographic profile of the residential areas is
similar to the city-wide statistics (Table 2).
In 2017, Waterfront Toronto issued a Request for
Proposals for the redevelopment of Quayside, a 12-acre
parcel on Toronto’s eastern waterfront into a “globally
significant demonstration project” (Waterfront Toronto,
2017, p. 9). Waterfront Toronto wanted more than just
a builder: It sought “an innovation and financial part-
ner” (Waterfront Toronto, 2017, p. 6). The Request for
Proposals acknowledged that the agency lacked the in-
house expertise and financial capacity to accomplish all
its objectives. It was also expected that this initial mixed-
use neighborhood could set the stage for the remaining
700 acres of eastern waterfront.
The winning proposal was submitted by Sidewalk
Labs, a Google affiliated company headquartered in
New York City. Sidewalk’s 200-page proposal (Sidewalk
Toronto, 2018) called for the creation of a neighborhood
that embraced technologies (‘built from the Internet
up’) that would realize maximum benefits and efficien-
cies through constant monitoring of activities. Not only
would modular buildings allow for their adaptation to
changing circumstances over time, but quotidian adjust-
ments could also be made to increase comfort and en-
ergy efficiency. The traffic patterns on streets could be
adjusted in response to fluctuations in volume, direction
andmode. The public realmwas seen as a critical compo-
nent of Quayside; for example, to encourage increased
activity in the public spaces, the proposal called for in-
ducing climate protection devices that would substan-
tially increase the time when people would be comfort-
able outdoors.
Several aspects of the proposed Quayside neigh-
borhood would set it apart from other developments.
The high density, mixed-use characteristics of Quayside
wouldmake it vibrant and attractive. The buildings, some
up to 30 stories tall, would be wood framed. Private vehi-
cles would be discouraged in favor of walking, bicycling,
public transit, and ride sharing services. This shift away
from private vehicles would be fostered by an attractive
public realm, priority pedestrian areas and bike lanes and
climate adaptations. Quayside would also incorporate
technological advances that, although not readily visible,
Table 2. Socio-economic characteristics of the Quayside area 2016 according to Statistics Canada (2016).
City of Toronto Quayside Neighborhood
CT 5350017.00
Population 2016 2,731,571 7,906
Average household size 2.4 1.7
Adults with BA 36.4% 49.8%
Median household income $65,829 $63,104
Low income rate 20.2% 21.2%
Unemployment rate 8.2% 6.8%
Median home value $601,922 $421,515
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would be instrumental in achievingWaterfront Toronto’s
objectives with respect to realizing a climate positive
development. An extensive digital network to collect,
analyze and adjust these systems would be provided.
Because of the experimental nature of the new technolo-
gies, one commentator described Quayside residents,
workers, and visitors as “guinea pigs” (Sauter, 2018).
Sidewalk released a 1,500-page Master Innovation
and Development Plan in June (Sidewalk Toronto, 2019).
As proposed, Quayside would include some 2.65 mil-
lion square feet of built space that would accommo-
date 3,952 workers and 2,670 residential units, along
with retail, social infrastructure, and public spaces. The
Master Innovation and Development Plan also outlined
a plan for development of a second parcel, the nearby
Villiers West neighborhood, proposed as the site of an
innovation center that would include Google’s Canadian
headquarters and a new Urban Innovation Institute.
Ultimately, Villiers West would include space for 7,680
jobs and 1,720 residences. Sidewalk Toronto would be
the developer for these two neighborhoods (Sidewalk
Toronto, 2019, Vol. 3, p. 87). The two areas would see
a decrease in the total square footage built of about 7%
from the initial Sidewalk proposal. Commercial develop-
ment, however, would be increased by more than a mil-
lion square feet, an increase of 150%.
In addition to the Villiers West development,
Sidewalk’s Master Innovation and Development Plan
outlined its vision for the redevelopment of an addi-
tional 155 acres to be known as the Innovative Design
and Economic Acceleration District. The District would
be a major initiative, accelerating job growth and in-
vestment. When fully developed, it would include al-
most 44,000 jobs and 30,470 dwelling units. Sidewalk
Toronto would be the lead developer for the Advanced
Systems that would extend throughout the Innovative
Design and Economic Acceleration District—the power
grid, thermal grid, waste management, stormwater man-
agement, freight management, dynamic streets, park-
ing management, digital access and mobility systems
(Sidewalk Toronto, 2019).
Sidewalk Labs argued that the inclusion of the en-
tire InnovativeDesign and Economic AccelerationDistrict
was crucial to the success of the development of the
first two neighborhoods. Many of the proposed innova-
tive Advanced Systems are not economically viable at
the scale of one or even two neighborhoods, but with-
out them the Quayside proposal would not be as innova-
tive and leading edge as either Sidewalk or Waterfront
Toronto desires. Two among the Sidewalk justifications
to proceed at the scale of the entire Eastern Waterfront,
were the economies of scale required to support the
development of a mass-timber production system, and
the need to reap value added at this large scale to
finance a Light Rail Transit (LRT), connecting the sec-
tor to Downtown Toronto. Consequently, Sidewalk was
prepared to invest heavily in the development of the
Innovative Design and Economic Acceleration District.
While Waterfront Toronto’s Request for Proposals de-
scribed Quayside as a pilot that could provide a model
for the redevelopment of the entire Eastern Waterfront,
the Sidewalk Labs’ Master Innovation and Development
Plan makes their participation in the subsequent devel-
opment of the 155-acre Innovative Design and Economic
Acceleration District essential. Sidewalk also requested
15 different regulatory adjustments and reforms, includ-
ing pre-approval of flexible development regulations and
innovative technology applications (Sidewalk Toronto,
2019, Vol. 3, pp. 224–226).
The Master Innovation and Development Plan pro-
posed a financial partnership between Sidewalk and the
public sector, primarily Waterfront Toronto and the City
of Toronto (Sidewalk Toronto, 2019, Vol. 3). Sidewalk
would invest $825 million in the Innovative Design
and Economic Acceleration district, plus $400 million
for optional credit support and $80 million for an off-
site tall timber factory (Sidewalk Toronto, 2019, Vol. 3,
pp. 154–155). In return, Sidewalk Toronto would receive
revenue from a variety of sources (Sidewalk Toronto,
2019, Vol. 3, pp. 174–179). For example, it would be ex-
empted from certain development charges and fees. The
company would also share in the increased land values
and receive fees based on the costs of municipal infras-
tructure and advanced systems. Sidewalk Toronto would
also earn fees for advisory services and for reaching per-
formance targets. The amounts of these fees will be ne-
gotiated in the Implementation Agreement. If Sidewalk
Toronto advanced funds for infrastructure construction,
they would be repaid at market interest rates. Note
as well that Sidewalk Labs stood to benefit financially
from the devices it would invent for the Toronto water-
front development, as well as from the reputation of this
project and the worldwide commissions that would en-
sue. Finally, Sidewalk Toronto sought performance fees
to recoup some of the tax revenues generated by the de-
velopments it will catalyze.
The Sidewalk Labs proposal encountered a good deal
of public opposition, considerably more than Amazon
did in Long Island City. Some of the issues, such as con-
cerns about guarantees of privacy (Kirkwood, 2019) and
the requested waiver of public development regulations
(Sauter, 2018; Sidewalk Toronto, 2018) are specific to
Quayside. There was also a feeling among civic organi-
zations and a newly elected provincial administration
that the Master Innovation and Development Plan did
not respect the original terms of the Waterfront Toronto
Request for Proposals and as such constituted a ‘land
grab’ (Benzie & Rider, 2019). Other issues, such as com-
plaints about inadequate public consultation and insuffi-
cient affordable housing opportunities (Bliss, 2019), are
more general.
After several months of negotiation, Sidewalk Labs
and Waterfront Toronto reached a tentative agreement
on a list of critical threshold issues. The developmentwas
scaled back to the original 12-acre parcel, deferring deci-
sions on the rest of the eastern waterfront until a later
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date. Sidewalk Labs, in partnership with a development
company, would be responsible for the vertical develop-
ment, while Waterfront Toronto would install the basic
public infrastructure. Additional commitments of public
resources would be negotiated separately. Many of the
proposed innovations, such as district heating, waiver of
development regulations and the creation of a data trust,
were eliminated. In February 2020, Waterfront Toronto
launched a consultation process on the revised propos-
als of Sidewalk, with the aim of arriving at a final decision
on the development on 31 May 2020.
Even though the company had spent two and a half
years and over 50million dollars planning and promoting
their proposal, on 7May 2020, Sidewalk Labs announced
that they were ending their involvement on the Toronto
waterfront, citing the uncertainties resulting from the
COVID-19 pandemic (Doctoroff, 2020; Passifiume, 2020).
Different interpretations were advanced to make sense
of the Sidewalk decision. There was, of course, a possi-
ble downward COVID-induced Toronto real estate trajec-
tory. But the decision was taken at a time when it was
still too early to fathom the long-term economic conse-
quences of the pandemic (O’Kane, 2020). Another pos-
sible explanation was that Sidewalk never felt comfort-
able with the idea of limiting its Toronto waterfront pres-
ence to the 12-acre Quayside site. Finally, the view was
advanced that Sidewalk was frustrated by the political
dynamics of Toronto, involving the participation of local
politicians and community groups in debates about the
Toronto waterfront (Lorinc, 2020).
4. Findings
The review of these two economic development mega-
deals suggests that, despite important differences, they
share important attributes. Both Amazon’s New York
HQ2 and Quayside were proposed for large and prosper-
ous cities. Both projects were located on the fringe of
their respective core business areas. Although both de-
velopments are large scale, they would represent only a
small part of the total growth in their respective areas.
Table 3 provides a summary of the key attributes
of each of the projects. The types of incentives offered
to the developers highlight the cumulative or path de-
pendent nature of local economic development policies.
Because Amazonwithdrew from its development in Long
Island City, less can be said about what the balance be-
tween the public sector’s actual financial contribution
and its returns might have been. Amazon asked each
community to indicate what incentives they would be
willing to give. New York City and State initially offered
$3 billion in incentives to secure a $5 billion investment.
Presumably, because Amazon would be splitting its in-
vestment and job creation between two locations, the
value of the incentives would also decrease.
Bringing employment opportunities to the project
location was an important component of both propos-
als. For Amazon, the development was all about jobs,
well-paying, technical jobs. Access to a high-tech work-
force appears to have been most decisive site selection
criterion for Amazon. The New York and Washington
metropolitan areas have the largest number of high tech
(computer and mathematical occupations) workers in
the country (Berube, 2018). The ready availability of ex-
isting sites and connectivity also seem to have been im-
portant factors.
The value of incentives, however, including grants,
tax abatements and infrastructure investments, does not
appear to have been a decisive factor in Amazon’s de-
cision. Locations close to the ones selected (Newark
and Montgomery County) offered much larger incentive
packages. As is often the case with economic develop-
ment incentives (Sands & Reese, 2012), the incentives
were frosting on the cake. Sidewalk Labs sought less in
terms of traditional incentives but rather asked for expe-
dited development approvals and participation in project
revenues that would normally accrue to the government
entities. Rather than asking for large payments from lo-
Table 3. Summary comparison of projects.
Incentives sought Nature of development Who would benefit Who would lose
Amazon Land
Grants
Tax abatements
Infrastructure
investment
Office headquarters
Highly paid jobs
Amazon
Skilled, high tech
workers
Lower income residents
Foregone city revenue
Reduced public capacity
for services
Sidewalk Land
Revenue Capture
Regulatory flexibility
Development fee
exemptions
LRT
Office headquarters
High density
Mixed use neighborhood
Technology test site
Smart infrastructure
Public spaces
Sidewalk Toronto
Luxury residential
market
High tech workers
Lower income residents
Foregone city revenue
Reduced public
capacity for services
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cal governments, Sidewalk Labs offered to advance funds
for the construction of the LRT connecting Quayside to
Union Station.
The developers of these two projects also differed
with respect to how they dealt with community reac-
tions. Amazon’s New York HQ2 encountered commu-
nity opposition which Amazon cited as a reason for
abandoning this location (Goodman, 2019). Amazon’s
approach to dealing with local governments in other
locations strongly suggests that they were unlikely to
make additional concessions to the community (Weise
et al., 2019). The public opposition to the Sidewalk pro-
posal was also substantial, but they continued to nego-
tiate with Waterfront Toronto, eventually conceding a
number of significant components of the proposals con-
tained in their Master Innovation and Development Plan
(Kirkwood, 2019; Zarum, 2019).
The projects discussed here involve high density de-
velopments serving largely high-end clienteles. As a re-
sult, the primary beneficiaries of both projects are skilled,
educated, and better off residents, and of course, the
bottom lines of the high-tech firms involved. Existing
businesses, commercial and residential real estate inter-
ests are likely losers, as are middle and lower income
residents who cannot afford the new housing or do not
have the skills to benefit from the high tech jobs, and
the general public that receives services from local gov-
ernments with reduced revenues as a result of tax and
fee diversion and the expenditures necessary to sup-
port the incentives. There is little evidence that the em-
phasis on high tech firms and clearer focus on higher
income residents represents a new economic develop-
ment paradigm. In our view, Big Tech has intensified the
economic development incentive process, but has not
fundamentally changed it.
5. Conclusion
We now return to the questions raised at the beginning
of this article: First, does the focus on high tech firms rep-
resent a new local economic development paradigm, one
that introduces new policy instruments to attract high
end jobs? Communities continue to offer standard pack-
ages of incentives and abatements. Attempts to justify
public investments in economic development are infre-
quent and often limited. For example, property tax abate-
ments may be rationalized by projections of future in-
come tax revenue, with little concern for indirect costs
such as increased congestion and declining housing af-
fordability. Amazon’s original HQ2 proposal could be eas-
ily justified by the income tax revenue derived from an
annual payroll of $750 million. The Sidewalk Labs pro-
posal did incorporate some innovative approaches to the
structuring of public private partnerships, but thesewere
not acceptable to Waterfront Toronto.
One aspect of local economic development that may
be changing with the emerging emphasis on high tech
and new economy investments is the shift from eco-
nomic development focused on distressed and declin-
ing areas to the already prosperous areas where the Big
Tech firms want to be anyway. It is not surprising that
these examples are drawn from cities that are gener-
ally regarded as global and prosperous. While New York
City and Toronto experience significant problems of high
housing costs, congestion and strained public services,
there is little indication that these issues have made
them unattractive to private developers. If the thriving
markets in these cities require billions of dollars of incen-
tives to attract investments, what does this say about
cities like Detroit, Cleveland, or Winnipeg? How much
subsidy would be required to make these weak market
cities attractive to large scale investments?
Second, will Big Tech shift the balance of power be-
tween the public and private sectors, as well as among
the communities seeking to attract new economy firms,
those that are high tech and information intensive? The
decision to abandon each of these projects was made by
the developer, rather than by the government. Indeed,
local government officials expressed regret over the can-
cellation (de Blasio, 2019; “Sidewalk Labs has walked
away,” 2020). But these cases may not be indicative of a
permanent or wide-spread paradigm shift. Amazon had
invested little in the New York site and clearly had plenty
of other available options. The decision to concentrate
on the Northern Virginia location returned Amazon to
their original HQ2 plan. While Sidewalk Labs invested
heavily in the Quayside proposal, their objectives were
much grander than Amazon’s. Sidewalk Labs sought de-
velopment control to well over a square mile of well-
located land in a prosperous community, participating
in what are traditionally municipal revenue streams, ac-
cess to detailed behavioral data and creating a test bed
for technological innovations (that could be marketed to
other cities). Such a proposal would likely be attractive to
a community that was truly desperate, the sort of com-
munity unlikely to attract the interest of Big Tech.
Big Tech firms, such as Alphabet, are perhaps
uniquely qualified to pursue these types of economic de-
velopment strategies. Google has large cash resources
that are readily available to be invested in projects such
as the LRT. Obviously, it is easy for Sidewalk to obtain a
commitment for the relocation of Google’s offices to the
District. Alphabet Companies are involved with develop-
ment of autonomous vehicles and other technology ap-
plications that could be deployed in Quayside.
Third, how does this ‘reaching for the top’ in terms of
firms and job categories and the economic status of res-
idents differ from the previous economic development
attempts to attract middle-class manufacturing jobs? It
seems likely that the Big Tech firms will increasingly play
a major role, seeking mega-deals that will support po-
tentially transformative projects. Here we would include
not only companies like Google and Amazon, but also
advanced manufacturing firms which incorporate signif-
icant amounts of technology in their products, includ-
ing motor vehicle and aerospace companies, computer
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chip manufacturers, battery and solar power companies.
These firms will likely continue to expand, requiring large
capital investments for which public subsidies and incen-
tives will be sought. But not all communities can com-
pete effectively in this arena. Cities and neighborhoods
within them that are already attractive and prosperous
will garner the lion’s share of these new economic prizes.
An important consequence of these trends will be
widening inequalities. Prosperous communities will at-
tract the lion’s share of investment and new jobs, both
because they can offer richer incentive packages and
because they are the locations the tech elite prefer.
Struggling communities will fall further behind with
some, out of desperation, continuing to offer incentive
packages that they can ill afford. Big Tech firms will en-
joy lower taxes with other taxpayers bearing the subsidy
burden through higher taxes and reduced service levels.
Social equity objectives occupied a more important
place among prior economic development policies than
they do within the present emanation of such policies.
They indeed attempted to attract investments to de-
prived areas and to create middle-class jobs, generally
in the manufacturing sector. The middle-class nature
of these jobs was in itself the main economic and so-
cial achievement of this form of economic development
(LeRoy, 2005). The types of policies described here con-
trast with this earlier model of economic development.
They are directed at the most economically appealing
cities and urban sectors therein and create jobs for highly
paid people and residential areas mostly dedicated to
the rich, raising doubts about the distributive effects of
these policies. Most open to criticism is the allocation of
different forms of public sector support to the most prof-
itable firms and to the highly paid employment and high-
income residents attracted to these developments. If an
argument can be made for the filtering down through
the economy of the wealth generated by these devel-
opments, it is important to point out that most of the
employment created by their multiplier effects is in low-
wage service jobs. Furthermore, in the inflated housing
markets of prosperous global cities, the arrival of such
developments can cause a crowding out of medium—
and low-income residents, thus exacerbating the conse-
quences of income polarization. In short, the ‘new’ eco-
nomic development paradigm fostered by the drive for
high tech firms appears to lead to bigger dealswith public
support but without public input, using the same old in-
centives, by wealthy cities, to wealthy firms, for the ben-
efit of wealthy residents.
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